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Abstract Little is known of the effects of the auction mechanism in
relation to post-auction market sales. This empirical study of
unsuccessful auctions shows that approximately half of these
properties were eventually sold via private negotiations, at higher
prices relative to last bids. The probability of a subsequent post-
auction transaction is signiﬁcantly higher for apartments and
terrace houses and when auction turnout is high; and lower in
the absence of any bid and in some years. In addition, downward
revisions to the opening bid improve the probability of
subsequent sale. Prices of subsequent re-auctioned and privately
negotiated sales decline with time to sale, consistent with the
search process explanation.
Introduction
Auctions have been extensively studied for many reasons, not the least of which
is that the auction mechanism provides a close approximation to the Walrasian
concept of market clearing and price discovery. Real estate auction, in particular,
has an added attraction in that it provides a centralized platform for buyers and
sellers in an otherwise highly decentralized real estate marketplace. However, the
study of price discovery during and after the auctions, in particular the effects on
post-auction prices and multiple auctions attempts, have been somewhat neglected
in the literature.
Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992) is one of the few papers that has examined post-
auction price behavior. The authors show that the auction prices for identical
condominium units in New Jersey were 13% higher than the prices determined in
subsequent face-to-face bargaining. This arose because of the unique institutional
framework where the ‘‘hammer price’’ is not necessarily binding,1 and an original
auction sale could ‘‘fall through.’’ This paper complements the earlier work by
using data from an institutional setup that binds hammer prices and auction sales.
Under this alternative framework, it is clear that only genuine bidders participate
at the auctions. However, unsuccessful sellers could seek out interested buyers
after the auction and privately negotiate. It is not uncommon for auction houses
and sellers to engage in subsequent negotiations when the auctioned object is
unsold at its reserve price (Bulow and Klemperer, 1996; footnote 22).40  Ong
Porter (1995) observes that oil and gas tracts that were not sold at auctions were
re-auctioned subsequently at higher prices. Cassady (1967) and Ashenfelter (1989)
also note that goods that were resold could be through another auction or through
private negotiations, and suggest that this process is used by the seller to obtain
a higher sale price. Horstmann and LaCasse (1997) offer an information signaling
explanation as to why sellers in auctions with secret reserve prices choose not to
sell when they have a resale option. Sellers attempt to communicate information
to potential bidders by choosing secret reserve prices (announced reserve prices
are easily mimicked) and voluntarily refusing to sell when their reserve prices are
not met. The delay in sale becomes a costly signal to mimic for sellers of lower-
value objects, and the refusal to sell becomes a proﬁtable signaling devise. The
Horstmann and LaCasse model predicts that the average price for goods that were
re-auctioned should increase with time to resale under the information signaling
theory. In contrast, average price should decrease with time to resale under the
traditional auction search model as sellers search for a new set of buyers in the
subsequent selling process.
This paper focuses on post-auction privately negotiated sales. This approach
attempts to better understand the price discovery process after unsuccessful auction
attempts and bridges the gap between auctions and negotiated sales. Hitherto, these
two processes have been viewed as mutually exclusive modes of price discovery
(Mayer, 1995; Bulow and Klemperer, 1996; Dotzour, Moorhead and Winkler,
1998; Mayer 1998; Allen and Swisher, 2000; and Quan, 2002). Bulow and
Klemperer, for instance, show that English auctions with no reserve price are
always preferable to negotiations when bidders’ signals are independent2 to the
extent that auctions attract bona ﬁde bidders. They demonstrate that the value of
additional bidders (competition) at auctions dominates the value of negotiating
skills.
The process of putting up a property for auction could provide valuable exposure
for the property by making the property available to potential buyers. And, even
though an auction is unsuccessful, either as a result of bids not meeting reserve
prices or lack of buyer interest, the auction process could be used to identify
potential buyers, and as such, could be viewed as an alternative or augmentation
to the listing process.
The ﬁrst objective of this paper is to examine the determinants that inﬂuence post-
auction sales, the deviation in eventual sale price from opening bids and the time
before a private sale is concluded. In addition, the interactive inﬂuence of market
interest such as turnout, number of bids (or no-bids), auction houses, property
type, state of the market and seller motivation is examined, as proxied by the
number of previous attempts and distress versus non-distress sales, by utilizing a
comprehensive dataset of all residential auctions in Singapore from 1995 to 2000.
Publicity exposure is deemed to have a positive price discovery effect if (a) a
subsequent privately negotiated sale occurs and (b) the privately negotiated sale
price is higher than some benchmark values determined at the time of the auction.Price Discovery in Real Estate Auctions  41
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This study uses the opening bid and the last bid before the property is withdrawn
from auction as the benchmark values to compute the price-bid differentials. In
addition, the price-bid differentials are examined to observe how they change with
the time taken to successfully negotiate a sale.
Reserve prices would have been preferred benchmark values to evaluate price
changes, but are unavailable in the dataset. In this regard, real estate auctions in
Singapore are no different from many auctions that are conducted with secret
reserve prices (Bulow and Klemperer, 1996). Although the market values are
estimated for auctioned properties, they are at best noisy estimates given uncertain
market conditions, especially in a market downturn where transaction volumes are
low. Thus, opening bids are used in this study as they provide an indication of
seller information set and motivation.3
The second objective is to study whether repeat attempts affect the probability of
sale and the subsequent price. In this regard, the study examines how revisions in
the opening bids, conditioned on an unsuccessful auction attempt, inﬂuence the
price discovery process. Speciﬁcally, a change in the opening bid is examined to
see how the change affects the probability of a subsequent sale. In addition, the
effects of the change in opening bids on the eventual transaction price is examined,
and for completeness, the auction price as well.
The third objective of this paper seeks to test the empirical predictions of the
Hortsmann and LaCasse (1997) information signaling model by utilizing post-
auction data for both re-auctions and negotiated sales. In addition, the data allows
an evaluation of the effect of bidders (Bulow and Klemperer, 1996) on the auction
and subsequent negotiated sales.
The objectives of this paper are closely related in spirit to the work by Knight
(2002) and Anglin (2004) where the focus is on changes in listing prices and re-
listings. The distinctions are that this work focuses on auctions rather than
Multiple Listing Service sales. Earlier it was noted that auctions provide a
centralized platform for buyers and sellers, and by inference, auctions should
provide better information on past attempts than listings do. In addition, the
research differs in that the focus is on opening bids, which are non-binding lower
bounds rather than listing prices, which are upper bounds set by sellers. The
common thread with these papers is the motivation to better understand how
properties transact.
Approximately half of the 963 unsuccessfully auctioned properties that were
examined were eventually sold via private negotiations. The probability of a
subsequent post-auction transaction is signiﬁcantly higher for apartments and
terrace houses and when auction turnout is high; and lower in the absence of any
bid and in some years. The price to opening bid differential increases with the
number of increments at the auction, but is lower for more atypical properties and
decreases with time-to-subsequent sale.
The empirical results show that the probability of a subsequent post-auction
transaction is signiﬁcantly higher for apartments and terrace houses and when42  Ong
auction turnout is high; and lower in the absence of any bid and in some years.
In addition, downward revisions to the opening bid improve the probability of
subsequent sale, although the empirical evidence indicates that numerous repeat
attempts actually diminish the likelihood that the property would be eventually
sold.
The price to opening bid differential increases with the number of increments at
the auction, but is lower for more atypical properties and decreases with time-to-
subsequent sale. Properties that did not receive any bids during the auction were
eventually sold through private negotiations at a signiﬁcantly lower price
compared to the opening bid. This result is consistent with the prediction in Bulow
and Klemperer (1996). The overall results also lend support to the hypothesis that
the auction mechanism provides a positive price discovery effect, ostensibly from
publicity and exposure at the auctions. This suggests that sellers could beneﬁt
from putting up their property for auction at least once even though it may not
be successfully sold at the action. At the minimum, the auction process would
provide a gauge of market interest and could increase the likelihood and price of
subsequent privately negotiated transactions.
Last but not least, the empirical predictions in Horstmann and LaCasse (1997) are
tested by analyzing the effect of time to re-auction on the auction price—previous
auction last bid differential. Although the sample is small, a weakly positive
relation consistent with the information signaling model postulated by Horstmann
and LaCasse is found. The last bid in the previous auction that did not go under
the hammer is viewed as an indication of the highest price buyers would pay. In
contrast, time to re-auction has a negative effect on the auction price–previous
opening bid, supporting the expectation that sellers use subsequent auctions as a
search process for new bidders. To the extent that sellers of unauctioned properties
that were subsequently sold through private negotiations could be viewed as
engaging in a renewed search process, the empirical prediction is that the sale
price should be lower with time to resale. The evidence shows that subsequent
prices decline relative to the last auction bids as time to subsequent sale increases,
reinforcing the notion that sellers engage in subsequent searches for buyers.
This paper is organized in ﬁve sections with a brief discussion of the auction
market in Singapore presented ﬁrst. Next, there is a discussion of the data,
followed by a discussion of the ﬁndings and concluding remarks.
 Auctions in Singapore
The dominant auction format in Singapore is the English ascending bid auction
with a secret reserve price. Auctions have generally been regarded as a last resort
method of disposal. The local sentiment toward auctions is similar to that of the
United States, where auctions are associated with distress properties—foreclosure
or mortgagee sales (Asabere and Huffman, 1992). Distress sales are typically put
up by the mortgagee (banks/ﬁnancial institution). There was a surge in auctionPrice Discovery in Real Estate Auctions  43
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sales following the Asian Financial Crisis from 1998 to 1999. Although a good
proportion comprises mortgagee sales, there has been a discernible increase in
owner auctions, due to a diminution of the stigma associated with auctions. Even
so, the number of properties put up for auction is very low, and reached a high
of approximately 3.5% of the total number of property transactions in 1998 and
1999. There has also been a growing perception among potential buyers that
auctions of distress properties provide a good avenue to acquire properties at
bargain prices. Buyers and sellers have a better understanding and awareness of
the efﬁciency of the auction system as a method of sale, and auction companies
in Singapore have substantially increased the frequency of auctions held each
month to meet the growing demand.
Bidders in Singapore are generally not aggressive. The success rate for each
bidding session varies from 10% to 50%; while the percentage of successful post-
auction private market transaction is higher. The low success rate has been
attributed to the ﬂagging performance in general, rather than the appeal of auctions
itself. Another possible cause of the low success rates is that many owners use
the auction process as a gauge of market interest in their properties. In addition,
some buyers withhold from biding during an auction in the hope of securing lower
transaction prices in post-auction private negotiations. Overly conservative bidding
and the expectation that private negotiations are more likely to secure a sale may
induce sellers to set unrealistically high reserve prices.
 Data
The sample comprises 1,654 private residential properties that were put up for
auction from 3Q1995 to 1Q2000 in Singapore. This sample covers all residential
auctions over that period. Residential properties are typically classiﬁed into high-
rise (apartments and condominiums) and low-rise (terrace, semi-detached,
detached houses). The data set includes variables on the location, date of auction,
number of turnout, auctioneer, distress sale versus by-owner sale, type of property,
tenure, opening bid, last bid and number of bid increments during the auction.
Properties that were put up auction more than once were omitted, reducing the
sample size to 1,281 properties. Of these, 318 properties were sold at the auction.
The remaining 963 properties that were not sold at auction form the focus of the
analysis.
Property transaction data are extracted from the ReaLink for a period from 1975:
Q1 to 2000:Q4, compiled by the Singapore Institute of Surveyor and Valuers
(SISV). An estimated market value was computed for all properties put up for
auction using either the last transacted price or comparable sales of other private
residential properties that are of the same type and in the same estate, having very
similar ﬂoor area and ﬂoor level.
Since the reserve price is secret (Vincent, 1995), a proxy measure called the level
of reserve price (LRP) is developed (DeBoer, Conrad and Mcnamara, 1992),44  Ong
which is deﬁned as the difference between the property’s estimated market value
and the opening bid, divided by the opening bid. The estimated market value is
the last transaction price for the auctioned property or the estimated market value
of properties most comparable to the auctioned property if there is no previous
transaction, adjusted by the price index (RPI). The adjustment uses the RPI from
the quarter prior to the auction, as information on the contemporaneous price index
is not available at the time of auction.
The state of the market (SOM) indirectly affects the sentiment of property buyers
and hence affects the probability of a sale (Mayer, 1995). The SOM is a dummy
variable given a value of zero if the auction occurred in a quarter following two
previous successive quarters of negative growth in the RPI. Year dummy variables
are also introduced to control for the timing of the auction (Vanderporten, 1992),
along with a property type dummy variable to distinguish high-rise properties from
low-rise properties—terrace, semi-detached and detached houses (TERR, SEMID
and DETACH). The data set also allows an identiﬁcation of properties that were
auctioned with vacant possession (VP) and that were distress sales (DISTR).
Properties that are identiﬁed as distress sales could mean that the sellers have a
set of different bargaining powers as opposed to auctions put up by owners.
Control dummy variables for the auction houses are also created for the big four
companies—Knight Frank (KF), Colliers Jardine (CJ), Jones Lang LaSalle (JLL)
and DTZ Debenham Tie Leung (DTZ). Maher (1989) and Ong, Lusht and Mak
(2005) show that the auction house may contribute to the probability of sale. In
addition, there is information on the turnout (TURNOUT) at the auctions (Burns,
1985), as well as the number of increments (INCREM) during the bidding process
(Ching and Fu, 2003).
In addition, the transactions for all the unsuccessful properties (until end 2000)
were traced. There were a total of 445 post-auction transactions, indicating that
close to half of the properties that were not sold at auctions were subsequently
sold through private negotiations. Of these, 117 properties received at least one
bid during the auction, and the remaining 328 properties did not receive any bid.
The post-auction transactions prices of the 445 properties are used to compute the
price-bid differentials using the opening bid and last bid before the property was
withdrawn (TPOB and TPSB, respectively). The time between the subsequent sale
and auction dates is the time-to-(subsequent)-sale (TOS). Exhibit 1 provides the
variables. Exhibit 2 presents the summary statistics.
 Analysis
Price-Bid Differentials
The preliminary evidence shows that properties that garnered some interest (bids)
sell (when they do) at higher prices than the opening bids and in a shorter timePrice Discovery in Real Estate Auctions  45
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Exhibit 1  Variables for Auction Data (3Q1995–1Q2000)
Variable Description
DISTR Distress sale  1
LRP Level of reserve price
PREVATT Number of previous auction attempts




TEN Tenure: Freehold (99 years)  1; or leasehold (99 years)
NOBID No bid received  1
SOM State of the market  1 if real estate market did not
experience two consecutive quarters of negative price
change
INCREM Number of increments
VP Property with vacant possession  1
COB % Change in previous opening bid from current opening bid
DCOB Change in opening bid  1
TPOB % Difference between subsequent sale price and opening bid
TPLB % Difference between subsequent sale price and last bid
TOS Number of days between auction and subsequent sale
D96, D97, D98, D99, D00 Year dummy variables for 1996 through 2000
KF, JLL, CJ, DTZ Auction house dummy variables
SUBSALE Subsequent sale  1
compared to properties that received no bid. The average price-open bid
differential (TPOB) is 2.08% for the sample of 448 properties that were
subsequently sold. In comparison, the average TPOB for properties that were
successfully auctioned is 8.20%. However, if these properties are segregated into
those that received at least one bid (category 1) and those that received no bid
(category 2), the average TPOBs are 1.53% and 4.38%, respectively. The
differences are statistically different at 5% level (t-Stat  4.089) (see Exhibit 3).
The average time-to-sale (TOS) is 108 days and 148 days for the two categories
of properties, respectively (the difference is also statistically different at 5% level;
t-Stat  2.761). In addition, the average price-last bid differential (TPLB) for the
117 properties that were eventually sold is 0.52%. Although this is not
statistically different from zero, it shows that some properties were negotiated at
higher prices than the last bid at the auction.46  Ong
Exhibit 2  Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max nob
SUBSALE 0.4930 0.5001 0 1 963
LRP 0.0559 0.3015 0 8.0917 963
SOM 0.5504 0.4977 0 1 963
VP 0.8847 0.3195 0 1 963
TENURE 0.8380 0.3686 0 1 963
TURNOUT 180.62 86.95 15 450 963
D96 0.0831 0.2761 0 1 963
D97 0.0415 0.1996 0 1 963
D98 0.4174 0.4934 0 1 963
D99 0.3946 0.4890 0 1 963
D00 0.0104 0.1014 0 1 963
PREVATT 0.2949 0.6609 0 5 963
COB 0.0105 0.0796 0.3409 1.6071 963
DCOB 0.0966 0.2955 0 1 963
TOS 167.35 208.55 0 1603 469
INCREM 0.3853 1.2694 0 12 963
TPOB
0.0169
0.1924 0.5667 1.2941 469
TPLB 0.0001 0.1633 0.4632 0.7094 128
KF 0.3427 0.4749 0 1 963
JLL 0.3022 0.4594 0 1 963
CJ 0.0914 0.2883 0 1 963
DTZ 0.2274 0.4194 0 1 963
TERR 0.1526 0.3598 0 1 963
SEMID 0.2264 0.4187 0 1 963
DETACH 0.1880 0.3909 0 1 963
NOBID 0.7456 0.4358 0 1 963
DISTR 0.4621 0.4988 0 1 963
Note: Deﬁnitions and descriptions of variables are provided in Exhibit 1.
COB  (previous OB – current OB)/current OB.Price Discovery in Real Estate Auctions  47
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Exhibit 3  Analysis of Time-to-Sale
At Least 1 Bid
Mean Std. Dev. nob
No Bid
Mean Std. Dev. nob t-Stat
Panel A: Analysis of Time-to-Sale and Price-Bid Differences
TOS 108.97 124.79 117 147.92 131.99 331 2.761*
TPOB 0.0153 0.1258 0.0438 0.1360 4.089*
TPLB 0.0052 0.1178
Panel B: Analysis of Price-Last Bid Differentials by Time-to-Sale
TOS
 60 days 0.0361 0.1030 59 0.0236 0.0795 107 4.159*
60–90 0.0538 0.0716 16 0.0525 0.0867 40 4.343*
90–180 0.0129 0.0776 21 0.0367 0.1547 85 0.684
180–360 0.0036 0.1872 14 0.0486 0.1383 68 1.042
 360 0.1506 0.2186 7 0.1048 0.2349 31 0.471
Panel C: Analysis of Price-Last Bid Differentials by Time-to-Sale
 60 days 0.0084 0.0959 59
60–90 0.0351 0.0633 16
90–180 0.0194 0.0814 21
180–360 0.0186 0.1714 14
 360 0.0009 0.1728 7
Exhibits 3 (Panel B) and 4 show the average price-open bid differentials (TPOB)
for the two categories by TOS. Positive average price-open bid differentials are
observed for properties that attracted some interest and that were subsequently
sold within 90 days of the auction. In contrast, properties that received no bid
were sold at discounts to the opening bids regardless of the time-to-sale. The
difference in average TPOBs across these two categories for sales within 90 days
are statistically signiﬁcant. This evidence suggests that a positive price discovery
effect occurred for properties that attracted market interest at the auction.
The negative TPOBs for category two properties could also be anecdotal evidence
that the reserve and opening bids are set too high, and subsequent private
negotiations yielded lower transaction prices. Unraveling the appropriateness of
the opening bids would require an estimate of the market value, which is examined
in the following section.
Positive average price-last bid differentials (TPLB) were also observed for
properties sold within 90 days [Exhibits 3 (Panel C) and 5]. The eventual48  Ong
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transaction prices do not differ much from the last bid for properties sold within
60 days of the auction (less than 1% on average), suggesting that the last bids
were close to the ﬁnal prices. However, the average TPLB for subsequent sales
concluded within 60 to 90 days is more than 3%. This suggests that sellers who
take up to three months to negotiate and agree to the eventual sale price obtained,
on average, higher prices.
However, any agreement that takes more than three months is likely to result in
lower transaction prices. Note that the average TPLB, regardless of time to sale,
is negative (Exhibit 3, Panel A). To the extent that post-auction privately
negotiated sales that occurred after 90 days represents a renewed search process4
and that the last bid at the initial auction is an indication of the price buyers are
willing to pay, the ﬁnding in Exhibit 3 (Panel C) is supportive of the prediction
by Horstmann and LaCasse (1997) that the average price decreases with time to
resale under the search model. Taken as a whole, the evidence suggests that sellers
engage in a renewed post-auction search process for a new set of buyers as
postulated by Horstmann and LaCasse (1997).5
Probability of Subsequent Privately Negotiated Sale
A probit model is estimated for the likelihood of a subsequent privately negotiated
sale (SUBOUT  1). Essentially the same set of explanatory variables that are
used to examine the factors that inﬂuence sale at the auction is adopted. The
results are given in Exhibit 6 (Model 1). Properties that received no bid (NOBID
 1) have a lower probability of sale (p-value  .0887), supporting the earlier
results. The turnout at the auction (TURNOUT), however, is signiﬁcant and
positive. This result is also consistent with Ong, Lusht and Mak (2005).
Surprisingly, distress sale6, the level of reserve price, state of market, number of
increments and number of previous attempts are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Not surprisingly, the probability of a subsequent sale is reduced in 1999 and 2000,
when the market is recovering. This suggests that post-auction price discovery is
likely to be more useful under uncertain market conditions. Interestingly, some
auction houses (KF and CJ) have a negative and signiﬁcant effect on the
probability of a subsequent sale. These two auction houses, in fact, have a positive
effect on the probability of an auction sale (Ong, Lusht and Mak, 2005). Taken
together, the evidence suggests that some tradeoff between at- and post-auction
success rates for these auction houses. The evidence also suggests that some
auction houses could provide a valuable screening mechanism for bidders—be it
in terms of realistic reserve prices, desirability, etc. A property is not successfully
auctioned by KF or CJ could be perceived by the market as a signal that the
property is ‘‘undesirable’’ and hence a lower probability of subsequent sale is
observed.
In Exhibit 6, Models 2 and 3 estimate the probit model of subsequent sale with
two added variables: the percentage change in the opening bid (COB) and a50  Ong
Exhibit 6  Probit Model of Subsequent Sale
Variable
1. No Adjustment for






Change in Opening Bid
Coeff. p-value
Constant 0.5237 0.1725 0.5779 0.1352 0.3949 0.3104
LRP 0.2155 0.3040 0.1310 0.4290 0.1723 0.2732
SOM 0.2298 0.3830 0.2516 0.3484 0.3269 0.2254
KF 0.4968*** 0.0539 0.5208** 0.0433 0.4960*** 0.0557
JLL 0.4289 0.1011 0.4717*** 0.0716 0.4189 0.1112
CJ 0.6261** 0.0288 0.6717** 0.0193 0.6452** 0.0254
DTZ 0.1877 0.4669 0.1857 0.4717 0.2263 0.3829
DISTR 0.0931 0.3479 0.1218 0.2328 0.0718 0.4839
TENURE 0.2087*** 0.0903 0.2082*** 0.0974 0.2765** 0.0302
TURNOUT 0.0015** 0.0158 0.0013** 0.0460 0.0014* 0.0410
D97 0.3123 0.1817 0.2781 0.2384 0.2590 0.2717
D98 0.3511 0.1840 0.3592 0.1824 0.4160 0.1253
D99 0.8337** 0.0000 0.7568** 0.0000 0.8058* 0.0000
D00 1.6832** 0.0035 1.5300** 0.0050 1.9909* 0.0035
TERR 0.2022 0.1263 0.1813 0.1769 0.1957 0.1528
SEMID 0.1072 0.3557 0.1157 0.3332 0.0707 0.5595
DETACH 0.1025 0.4048 0.1635 0.1992 0.1544 0.2292
VP 0.1152 0.4068 0.1104 0.4331 0.1571 0.2707
INCREM 0.0094 0.8110 0.0039 0.9219 0.0121 0.7595
PREVATT 0.0992 0.1437 0.3471** 0.0001 0.6926* 0.0000
NOBID 0.1962*** 0.0887 0.1923*** 0.1056 0.0198 0.8674
COB 6.1929** 0.0000
DCOB 2.0798* 0.0000
Notes: The dependent variable is SUBSALE; and nob is 963. Log-likelihood: No Adjustment for
Change in Opening Bid  601.95; Percentage Change in Opening Bid  570.13; and
Dummy Variable Change in Opening Bid  552.59.
*Signiﬁcant at the 1% level using a two-tailed t-test.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level using a two-tailed t-test.
***Signiﬁcant at the 10% level using a two-tailed t-test.Price Discovery in Real Estate Auctions  51
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dummy variable indicating a change in the opening bid (DCOB). The COB is
measured as the percentage difference in the previous opening bid from the
opening bid at the latest auction, so a positive COB is indicative of a reduction
in opening bids. The likelihood of a subsequent sale increases in both COB and
DCOB (both variables are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level). So a downward
revision in the opening bid, ostensibly reﬂecting revisions in the seller’s reserve
price, would be viewed positively by the market, and aids in the price discovery
process.
As an aside, it should be noted that the number of previous attempts (PREVATT)
became signiﬁcant in Models 2 and 3. The negative sign on PREVATT indicates
that the probability of a subsequent sale actually decreases with a higher number
of repeat attempts. So while revisions in opening bids yield a positive effect,
excessive attempts could result in the opposite effect.
Determinants of Price-Open Bid Differential
As discussed earlier, the negative TPOBs observed for properties that received no
bids could be attributed to unrealistic reserve prices (as reﬂected by opening bids).
To investigate this, a simple regression model is used to examine how the price-
bid differentials are inﬂuenced by various explanatory variables; in particular, a
control is introduced for the estimated market value by way of the LRP variable.
The sample selection issue (for properties that were subsequently sold) is
controlled for by way of estimating the inverse Mills ratio from the probit model
from Exhibit 6.
Model 1 in Exhibit 7 reports the results only for properties that were subsequently
transacted, while Model 2 is estimated for properties that were successfully
auctioned to provide a comparison. The inverse Mills ratio is estimated separately
for the two models, using only the sample of unsuccessful sales from a probit
model (as reported in Exhibit 6) for Model 1. A separate probit model using all
auctions but deﬁning only successful auction sale is estimated for Model 2. For
completeness, TPOB is also investigated for all properties sold, regardless of
whether at an auction or through a subsequent private negotiation (Model 3). For
Model 3, a probit model based on all auctions is estimated, but deﬁning the
dependent variable as 1 when the property is sold either at the auction or
subsequently.
The results show that the price-open bid differential increases in the number of
increments and turnout. This implies that the eventual sale price (relative to
opening bid) is increasing in market interest, as proxied by turnout and bid
increments.
The negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on time-to-subsequent sale (TOS) is also
consistent with the earlier result showing that the price-bid differential is higher
when the sale is negotiated closer to the auction date. The ﬁndings indicate that
TOS has a diminishing but insigniﬁcant marginal effect on the price-bid52  Ong








Constant 0.0048 0.9430 0.0588 0.5858 0.0065 0.8952
LRP 0.0200 0.0909 0.0011 0.9656 0.0013 0.9170
SOM 0.0542 0.2566 0.0620 0.1859 0.0054 0.8785
KF 0.0677 0.1522 0.0064 0.9537 0.0189 0.5105
JLL 0.0606 0.1438 0.0307 0.7793 0.0044 0.8790
CJ 0.1248 0.0254 0.0185 0.8661 0.0129 0.6884
DTZ 0.0557 0.1342 0.0154 0.8902 0.0140 0.6214
DISTR 0.0418 0.0700 0.0063 0.6105 0.0312** 0.0100
TENURE 0.0407 0.1445 0.0200*** 0.0558 0.0030 0.7899
TURNOUT 0.0002 0.1467 0.0001** 0.0147 0.0001** 0.0058
D96 0.0637** 0.0521 0.0083 0.9226 0.0338 0.1843
D97 0.1119 0.0093 0.1955*** 0.0514 0.1259* 0.0010
D98 0.0059 0.9211 0.0118 0.8972 0.0466 0.2601
D99 0.0261 0.5417 0.0839 0.2945 0.0332 0.1189
D00 0.0979 0.3269 0.0676 0.3375 0.0082 0.8017
TERR 0.0370 0.1158 0.0221** 0.0156 0.0118 0.2438
SEMID 0.0750* 0.0006 0.0167 0.1328 0.0342* 0.0012
DETACH 0.0133 0.6820 0.0345* 0.0049 0.0318** 0.0220
VP 0.0295 0.2487 0.0011 0.9313 0.0106 0.4844
INCREM 0.0170 0.0256 0.0085* 0.0000 0.0106* 0.0000
PREVATT 0.0061 0.7678 0.0004 0.8998 0.0040 0.4167
NOBID 0.0214 0.3314 0.0210** 0.0451
TOS 0.0002* 0.0006 0.0294** 0.0294
COB 0.0280 0.7666 0.0001* 0.0009
IMR 0.0801 0.2251 0.0418* 0.0030 0.0820 0.1220
R2 0.1237 0.4656 0.3584
Notes: All standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust; IMR (Inverse Mills Ratio) for Model 1 is
obtained from probit model in Exhibit 6; IMR for Model 2 is obtained from probit model for
successful auction sale. nob: No Adjustment for Change in Opening Bid  448; Percentage
Change in Opening Bid  318; and Dummy Variable Change in Opening Bid  767.
*Signiﬁcant at the 1% level using a two-tailed t-test.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level using a two-tailed t-test.
***Signiﬁcant at the 10% level using a two-tailed t-test.Price Discovery in Real Estate Auctions  53
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differential. Lower differentials are observed for more atypical properties such as
terrace, semi-detached and detached houses, although the reduction is statistically
signiﬁcant only for semi-detached houses that were subsequently sold.
The evidence on the number of previous attempts and no-bid situations is rather
mixed. The coefﬁcient on the number of previous attempts is negative and
insigniﬁcant in both models, consistent with the earlier analysis that excessive
repeat attempts may be detrimental to sale. No-bid is negative but is signiﬁcant
only for the entire sample (Model 3). The results in Model 3 imply that properties
that did not receive any bids during an auction were eventually sold through
private negotiations at a signiﬁcantly lower price compared to the opening bid.
To the extent that Bulow and Klemperer (1996) view auctions as a more attractive
option for sellers in identifying potential buyers, the complete lack of bidders at
the auction observed ex post would indicate that auctions are not a good
mechanism. As such, this suggests that the eventual sale price would be lower
when no bids were received. The negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on NOBID
in Model 3 is consistent with the theoretical prediction in Bulow and Klemperer.
Information Signaling
The next series of test evaluates the information signaling theory postulated by
Horstmann and LaCasse (1997). Recall that the information signaling theory
model predicts that the average price for goods that were re-auctioned should
increase with time to resale. Properties were identiﬁed that were unsuccessful in
previous auctions that were subsequently sold through auction. Of the 328
successful auctions, 52 have been previously put up for auction. Of these, only
14 received bids in the previous auction.
A pertinent question is the reference value for the property at the previous auction.
Clearly, the last bid received at the unsuccessful auction is a good indication of
value. However, as demonstrated earlier, the opening bid as determined by the
sellers and auctioneers is also another indication of the secret reserve price. As
such, two tests are conducted. The ﬁrst test examines the difference between the
auction price and the last bid received in the previous auctions, while the second
test looks at the differential between the auction price and opening bid from the
previous auction. However, the lack of bids in the previous auction would a priori
suggest that subsequent auctions are searches for new sets of bidders. The key
variable is the time to re-auction (between the successful auction and the previous
attempt7). The information signaling theory predicts that the differential would be
increasing in time to re-auction (TOR). However, if no bids are registered in
previous auctions, then the price–previous opening bid differential is expected to
be decreasing in TOR, which is consistent with the search theory.
The average auction price differential from the last bid in the previous
unsuccessful auction is 1.70%. If outliers for re-auctions more than one year were
excluded, the average differential goes up to 4.77% for 13 observations. Further,54  Ong
Exhibit 8  OLS Regression on Re-auction Differentials
Dependent Variable
Variable











Constant 0.1291*** 0.0717 0.1945 0.1408 0.1996 0.4397
DISTR 0.0995 0.1296 0.2175** 0.0418 0.2286 0.1146
TERR 0.0354 0.5417 0.0967* 0.0076 0.1119** 0.0138
SEMID 0.2130* 0.0003 0.0069 0.8918 0.0293 0.8847
DETACH 0.0282 0.4345 0.0022 0.9510 0.0202 0.9417
TENURE 0.0147 0.7453 0.0169 0.9330
TURNOUT 0.0001 0.6580 0.0000 0.6487
TOR 0.0001 0.9147 0.0004** 0.0351 0.0004*** 0.0577
TOR*LB 0.0007 0.2118 0.1996*** 0.0555
R2 0.1496 0.3501 0.2188
nob 13 48 48
Notes: All standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust. TOR is the time to re-auction (i.e., the
number of days between the successful auction and the previous attempt. LB is a dummy variable
for auctions that received bids in the previous attempts.
*Signiﬁcant at the 1% level using a two-tailed t-test.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level using a two-tailed t-test.
***Signiﬁcant at the 10% level using a two-tailed t-test.
a regression (see Exhibit 8) of the auction price–previous last bid differential to
time to re-auction (TOR) shows a positive but statistically insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient,
after controlling for distress sales and property types. This result provides some
support for the Horstmann and LaCasse (1997) information signaling model, but
acknowledge that the small number of observations is a cause for concern.
If the analysis to the price–opening bid is expanded from the previous auction
differential, the mean difference is 6.03% excluding outliers where TOR is more
than one year (for comparison purposes, the mean difference in opening bids from
the previous auction is 7.28%). The price–previous opening bid differential is
decreasing in time to re-auction (Exhibit 8, last column).8 Although the coefﬁcient
on TOR is signiﬁcant only at a p-value of .0577, the evidence is consistent with
the search theory. Interestingly, the coefﬁcient on the interaction variable between
TOR and a dummy variable for auctions that received bids in previous attempts
(LB) is positive and signiﬁcant at a p-value of .0555. This result further provides
support for the Horstmann and LaCasse (1997) information signaling model.Price Discovery in Real Estate Auctions  55
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Notes: All standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust; IMR (Inverse Mills Ratio) is obtained from
the probit model in Exhibit 6. nob  117.
*Signiﬁcant at the 1% level using a two-tailed t-test.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level using a two-tailed t-test.
***Signiﬁcant at the 10% level using a two-tailed t-test.56  Ong
As an aside, a negative and signiﬁcant relation is found between TOR and the
changes in opening bids (second column of Exhibit 8). This is not surprising given
the fact that a lack of bids is a strong signal that the opening bid is too high.
However, the reduction in the opening bid is not statistically different across
properties that were successfully re-auctioned and those that were not.9
The ﬁnal test is to extend the search theory to subsequent privately negotiated
sales and to evaluate the effect of time to subsequent sale (TOS) on the transaction
price–last bid differential (TPLB). As mentioned earlier, the traditional search
auction model implies that the average price should decrease with time to resale.
The same relation is expected to hold for a search model for negotiated sale. The
regression results in Exhibit 9 show a negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on TOS,
after controlling for other pertinent variables. This evidence further supports the
ﬁnding that post-auction transactions via private negotiations are consistent with
a search process.
 Conclusion
This paper presents an examination of post-auction price discovery. The premise
is that the auction process itself may provide positive publicity or exposure effects
to the extent that sellers gather useful information even if no sale is made at the
auction. About half of the properties that were unsuccessful at the auction were
eventually sold via private negotiation. The majority of subsequent sales occur
within 180 days of the auction.
The evidence is consistent with the market interest explanation—the higher the
level of market interest, the more likely a subsequent private sale and the higher
the price relative to opening bid. Interestingly, the number of increments received
during the auction affects only the price differential and not the probability of
subsequent sale. The results suggest that sellers could beneﬁt from putting up their
property for auction at least once even though it may not be successfully sold at
the action. At the minimum, the auction process would provide a gauge of market
interest and could increase the likelihood and price of subsequent privately
negotiated transactions.
The ﬁndings indicate that revisions in the opening bids when earlier attempts were
unsuccessful increase the probability of subsequent sale. There is, however, a
tradeoff between bid revisions and excessive repeat attempts—excessive repeat
attempts could have a negative price discovery effect. Interestingly, the probability
of subsequent sale actually decreases with certain auction houses. The fact that
these same auction houses are more likely to successfully auction properties
suggests that they provide a valuable screening mechanism in the auction price
discovery process. Properties that were put up for auction by these houses, and
were unsuccessful at auction, could be viewed as ‘‘undesirable’’and hence a lower
probability of subsequent sale is observed.
Last but not least, the empirical predictions in Horstmann and LaCasse (1997)
were tested by analyzing the effect of time to re-auction on the auction price–Price Discovery in Real Estate Auctions  57
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previous auction last bid differential. There is a positive relation consistent with
the information signaling model postulated by Horstmann and LaCasse (1997)
albeit only in a small sample. The last bid in the previous auction that did not go
under the hammer is viewed an indication of the highest price buyers would pay.
In contrast, time to re-auction has a negative effect on the auction price–previous
opening bid, supporting the expectation that sellers use subsequent auctions as a
search process for new bidders. To the extent that sellers of unauctioned properties
that were subsequently sold through private negotiations could be viewed as
engaging in a renewed search process, the empirical prediction is that the sale
price should be lower with time to resale. The evidence shows that subsequent
prices decline relative to the last auction bids as time to subsequent sale increases,
reinforcing the notion that sellers engage in subsequent searches for buyers.
Some questions remain unanswered. For example, the price differential for
properties that were subsequently sold is lower on average than for auctioned
properties, suggesting that (a) the process of auction generates higher realized
transaction prices as auction theory would indicate (i.e., the winner’s curse) and/
or (b) the opening bids for auctioned properties are lower in comparison to
properties that were not sold at the auction. Unraveling these effects could be
interesting in order to evaluate the information value of opening bids.
Also, how do prices for properties that were subsequently sold after the auction
compare against those that were not put up for auction? While properties sold at
auctions have higher price-open bid differentials compared to post-auction
properties,10 are post-auction prices signiﬁcantly different from auction prices?
How would prices differ when properties are re-auctioned? Future work will seek
to address some of these questions.
 Endnotes
1 Thirty-seven percent of the sample in the Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992) study were
not sold at the ‘‘hammer prices.’’
2 he same result holds under certain conditions when signals are afﬁliated. To the extent
that auctions attract bona ﬁde bidders, Bulow and Klemperer (1996) show that English
auctions with no reserve price are always preferable to negotiations when bidders’signals
are independent. The insight is that auctions allow sellers to identify genuine buyers,
and that an auction with N  1 bidders dominates any negotiation with N bidders. The
data allows identiﬁcation of an auction that does indeed attract additional bidders in that
property auctions that did not attract a bid can be separated out.
3 Bidding starts at the opening bid. In some markets, it is not uncommon for an auctioneer
to ‘‘pick a bid out of the air.’’ In Singapore, however, reserve prices are disclosed to the
auctioneer only on the day of the auction itself, and auctioneers have to rely on appraisals
and identify interested buyers during the open house viewings prior to the auction. Since
auctioneers only know the reserve price for a property literally hours before the auction,
they usually set a realistic opening bid that would convey useful information to interested
bidders identiﬁed prior to the auction. Auctioneers have anecdotally veriﬁed that opening58  Ong
bids are usually good indications of the reserve prices. This is particularly so over the
sample period when the real estate market was ‘‘soft.’’
4 The data does not enable a determination of whether the property is subsequently sold
to a bidder who participated in the bidding during the auction.
5 As a caveat, it should be noted that the Horstmann and LaCasse (1997) model assumes
a second price auction to compare their information signaling re-auction model with a
traditional search auction model. Expected revenues are, however, the same for ﬁrst-
and second-price auctions (Milgrom, 2004).
6 Ong, Lusht and Mak (2005) ﬁnd the distress sales variable to be signiﬁcant in
determining the outcome of successful auction.
7 The date of the ﬁrst unsuccessful auction is used when there is more than one previous
attempt.
8 The results remain unchanged when outliers are included in the regression.
9 The mean change in opening bids for properties that were not successfully sold at re-
auctions is 9.29%. The t-Stat for difference in means is 0.7344.
10 This result could be attributed to differences in opening bids.
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